

# Daiwa's View

# Bracing for prolongation of demand shocks

V-shaped recovery unlikely, given lockdowns and production adjustments

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# Spread of COVID-19 in **Europe and US**

Lockdowns have drastically changed global economic conditions

Due to combination of supply shocks and demand shocks, pace of recovery is likely to be moderate

IMF World Economic Outlook sees global economy shifting to recession scenario in 2020

Preventing spread of virus is vital; sense of crisis in Tokyo

Japan will face downward pressure in Apr-Jun due to output adjustments, weak external demand, and a mood of self-restraint

# Bracing for prolongation of demand shocks

In Since the beginning of March, the COVID-19 virus has been rampant in Europe and the US. The sense of crisis in the Asian region is now being shared by the US and Europe, after a lag of several weeks. In late March, travel bans and restrictions on going out were tightened in various countries, and the lockdown of cities began. In order to prevent the spread of infection, the flow of people and goods has been stopped suddenly, so, even if it is temporary, sudden contraction of economic activity is unavoidable. The global economic landscape has changed drastically. Although we expected Jan-Mar negative growth in Asia centering in China, sluggish economic activity in Europe and the US has increased the possibility of global negative growth in Apr-Jun.

Meanwhile, as the US and European nations have started to formulate full-blown economic measures, we can now see the direction of various measures. Since the details and size of the measures have been disclosed, we are now just waiting for them to be implemented. Many anticipate a V-shaped recovery in Jul-Sep after suspended operations in Apr-Jun, assuming the pandemic comes to an end at an early stage. However, we should recognize that the automobile industry already faced a slump due to a decline in global demand before the spread of COVID-19. Given the supply shocks caused by the supply chain disruption and the additional demand shocks, we should keep in mind that the pace of recovery is likely to be moderate in the US, as well.

On 23 March, IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva expressed a sense of crisis, saying that the global economy in 2020 will enter a recession due to the new coronavirus pandemic, and that the first negative growth since 2009 (or in eleven years) since the global financial crisis (down 0.1%) would be inevitable. Her statement indicated a shift to a recession scenario in the World Economic Outlook to be announced in mid-April. However, the main scenario appears to be a recovery in 2021 due to early containment of the virus. If an end to the spread of the virus is delayed, the timing of the recovery will be delayed. Therefore, containing the spread of the virus is important. At an emergency meeting on 25 March in Japan, Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike requested that people refrain from going outside this weekend for nonessential reasons, expressing a sense of crisis that Tokyo is in a "critical phase" in which it might see an "explosion" of cases. Until new medicines are developed, the spread of the virus will not stop without the cooperation of the public.

I had already expected the weakness in Jan-Mar to linger to Apr-Jun. However, now, negative growth for the third consecutive quarter is almost certain because of suspended operations (output adjustments in line with weaker demand) at domestic auto plants (such as Toyota Motor) and weak external demand due to the impact of the aforementioned lockdowns in Europe and the US. Therefore, GDP in Apr-Jun is expected to fall more than in the Jan-Mar quarter. If the spread of the virus is not stopped and the mood of self-restraint is prolonged, downward pressure will increase.



Negative growth for third consecutive quarter expected; government removes "recovery" from wording in report

Both manufacturers and non-manufacturers worsened to doubledigit negative readings in March Reuters Tankan

DIs among large manufacturers to fall into negative territory in BOJ's March Tankan; start of economic recession

COVID-19 pandemic has caused collapse of highlevel DIs among nonmanufacturers, which were foundation of Japan's soundness

Impact of fewer inbound tourists to be confirmed by *Sakura* Report

Government considering emergency economic package, given the severe economic conditions


With GDP expected to contract by around 10%, Y50tn-plus package appears reasonable Since negative growth for the third consecutive quarter (since Oct-Dec 2019) is expected, the economy is now in a recession. In the Monthly Economic Report announced on 26 March, the Cabinet Office made a downward revision to its overall economic assessment and switched its wording from "recovering moderately" to in a "severe situation." This is the first time in six years and nine months that the wording "recovery" has been removed from the report.

Japan's economic data for Feb-Mar is now available, and it shows a marked slump in sentiment. In the March Reuters Tankan released on 17 March (242 firms responded out of a universe of 400 firms during the survey period of 2-12 Mar), the sentiment index worsened to –20 among manufacturers and –10 among non-manufacturers (charts 1 and 2). In the former, the reading plunged by 15 points m/m, posting the biggest decline since April 2011 immediately after the Great East Japan Earthquake. The readings fell into negative territory in all sectors. In particular, deterioration was drastic in steel/nonferrous metals (down 28 points) and foods (down 27 points). The survey included comments that the situation is like the one immediately after the Lehman crisis mainly in steel-related and construction fields, and that capex plans have been partially postponed or cancelled. The sentiment index is projected to fall by another 25 points, suggesting that the negative impact of disrupted supply chains will be prolonged mainly in the auto sector. The business condition DIs among large manufacturers are also expected to fall into negative territory in the BOJ's March Tankan to be released on 1 April. This is likely to reconfirm the start of an economic recession.

The sentiment index among non-manufacturers posted the largest-ever decline (down 25 points m/m). The COVID-19 outbreak caused a collapse of DIs among non-manufacturers, which had been maintaining the soundness of Japan's economy. The plunge was substantial especially in transport/utility (down 46 points) and wholesalers (down 39 points). People involved pointed to a decline in the container cargo volume and the marked influence of a reduction in inbound tourists. Although the sentiment index is projected to remain unchanged at –10, a downtrend is likely to continue if signs of an end to the virus outbreak are not confirmed. More concrete conditions will become apparent in the interview survey of the BOJ's Regional Economic Report (*Sakura* Report) to be released on 9 April.


Given the severe outlook, the government is moving to formulate an emergency economic package to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic that will accompany the compilation of the FY20 supplementary budget for approval by early/mid-April. At the end of 2019, large-scale economic measures (Y26tn on all-projects basis) were formulated to avoid an economic slowdown after the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games. With the decision to postpone the Olympic Games, such economic measures seem to be somewhat incomplete. It would be effective to combine these two packages by reviewing, in so far as possible, how they will be used so that they can be made to be in line with recent developments. The April economic package is anticipated to be of a similar size to the one during the global financial crisis (around Y56.8tn), which appears reasonable, considering that I now estimate that the COVID-19 pandemic will reduce GDP by about 10%. In addition, its effects will be maximized if beneficiaries are limited to people/companies in need of help (income compensation and corporate support). Moreover, it would be good to establish a flexible framework that can implement additional measures to maintain employment and avoid corporate bankruptcies when the entire extent of the damage has been confirmed.

**Chart 1: Business Conditions DI Among Large Manufacturers** 



Source: BOJ, Reuters; compiled by Daiwa Securities. Note: Symbols away from lines indicate forecasts.

# **Chart 2: Business Conditions DI Among Large Non-manufacturers**



Source: BOJ, Reuters; compiled by Daiwa Securities. Note: Symbols away from lines indicate forecasts.

Instability of financial markets still requires caution as Japan heads towards end of fiscal year / Central banks should provide support to maintain flow of money

Central banks pressured by market to take further action, like during Lehman crisis

If demand shocks are prolonged, central banks may need to consider next move

Until end of pandemic comes into view, international cooperation and collaboration with government will be important

As we approach the end of March, the final month of Japan's fiscal year, the instability of financial markets still requires caution. With regard to the shortage of dollar liquidity, however, six major central banks agreed to enhance provision of dollar liquidity on 20 March. The Fed also resumed CP purchases on 17 March, followed by the introduction of a credit support program on 23 March, in addition to its decision to buy unlimited amounts of US Treasuries and MBS. The BOJ also increased ETF purchases to reduce the risk premium. As such, a series of necessary moves were taken by central banks. Their role is to provide support to maintain the flow of money, even if the flow of people and goods stops.

The virus outbreak brings to mind the wise words of former BOJ governor Masaaki Shirakawa who said that crises always come in different forms. Some have said the coronavirus shock is similar to Black Monday (Oct 1987) in terms of heightened uncertainties about the future, fear that no end is in sight, and market restlessness. On the other hand, current conditions are also similar to the September 2008 Lehman shock in terms of central banks being pressured to take further action if a rapid succession of new easing steps fail to stop markets from falling. However, the current crisis clearly differs in many ways. First, the epicenter of the crisis is China, not the US. Second, this crisis was caused by the spread of an infectious disease and not the collapse of a financial bubble. That said, if concerns about a credit crunch ultimately spread, supply shocks persist, and demand shocks are prolonged, the current emergency steps will be insufficient and measures to address a recession will probably eventually become necessary.

In the near-term, the government will play an important role. However, it's safe to say that the central bank should also be giving thought to its next move if it wants to be prepared for a protracted struggle. In the Summary of Opinions at the BOJ Monetary Policy Meeting on 16 March (released 25 Mar), several members assume the slump will be prolonged and insist that it is necessary to maintain a strong cooperative framework with the government. Until an end of the pandemic comes into view, international cooperation and collaboration with the government will be important.



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