

Daiwa's View

Short-term steepening pressure, long-term flattening pressure

- Situation would change when consideration about “stage after increased JGB issuance” deepens

Fixed Income Research Section
FICC Research Dept.

Chief Strategist
Eiichiro Tani, CFA
(81) 3 5555-8780
eiichiro.tani@daiwa.co.jp



Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd.

Situation would change
when consideration
about “stage after
increased JGB
issuance” deepens

Short-term steepening pressure, long-term flattening pressure

Last Friday, I had the honor of making a speech at a seminar held by the Securities Analysts Association of Japan. I sincerely thank the participants and investors who recommended me.

Through this seminar, I recognized the strength of structural factors behind yield declines. As the Fed pointed out, the yield declines over recent decades became a trend due to a notable decline in the “equilibrium real interest rates.” A series of central bank actions such as negative interest rates are just the results of passive actions in reaction to the decline in the equilibrium real interest rates.


◆ Minutes of FOMC meeting on 29-30 Oct 2019 (20 Nov 2019)

- With estimates of equilibrium real interest rates having declined notably over recent decades, policymakers saw less room to reduce the federal funds rate to support the economy in the event of a downturn.

Even in such a situation, global yields are currently rising. In particular, the bear steepening of the JGB yield curve stands out (right-hand chart below). Will this trend continue?

If we first state the conclusion, the factors that caused the decline in the equilibrium real interest rates have eased, while such easing is a temporary phenomenon amid responses to the COVID-19 crisis. Now, market participants are paying full attention to “increased JGB issuance and the BOJ’s stance on operations,” but the situation surrounding the yield curve is likely to change when consideration about the market deepens after the increased issuance. Market participants need to recognize the existence of the two forces of “short-term steepening pressure” and “long-term flattening pressure.”

Chart: Natural Rate of Interest in US



Source: Fed, CBO, Blue Chip; compiled by Daiwa Securities.

Chart: Steepening of JGB Yield Curve




Source: Bloomberg; compiled by Daiwa Securities.

We [have explained](#) major factors behind the global decline in the equilibrium real interest rates (natural rate of interest) thus far. In this report, we examine whether four factors—(1) demographics, (2) a decline in debt-financed investment, (3) a change in income distribution, and (4) excessive supply of funds—will lead to changes.

◆ **Examination regarding situation of yield decline factors**

- (1) Long explanations about the demographics are unnecessary. Even before or after the pandemic, downward yield pressure caused by the megatrend of the aging population is unchanged.
- (2) Since the global financial crisis, corporate debt financing sharply declined. Recently, the trend has turned around. That said, the increase is mainly caused by temporary financing activities to cope with the funding crisis in line with lower sales due to lockdowns, meaning the lack of the aspect of “investment” to drive economic growth. Even if downward yield pressure eases in terms of this point, it would only be a temporary phenomenon.

Chart: Net Debt/EBITDA Ratio in Japan and US (index constituent companies)



Source: Bloomberg; compiled by Daiwa Securities.

- (3) Due to fiscal measures and cash handouts in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, income redistribution has been reinforced in major advanced nations. This may have temporarily eased the issue of income distribution, which has long put downward pressure on yields. On the other hand, it has become apparent that the pandemic caused the greatest damage to the most vulnerable populations. Once temporary redistribution in line with the pandemic is suspended, the issue of income distribution would worsen. Unless a program of full-scale income redistribution, such as basic income, is adopted, we are likely to face downward yield pressure again after the crisis ends.


◆ **Chicago Fed president Charles Evans (24 Jun 2020)**

• While the economic impact has been catastrophic for an extraordinarily large number of people and businesses, sadly, the cost has fallen most heavily on some of our most vulnerable populations. ...Like you, I am outraged and horrified by injustices toward the black community. Racism has no place in our society, and each of us has a responsibility to combat it.

- (4) As economist Lawrence Summers has pointed out, one background factor behind the globally falling neutral interest rate is excess demand for safe assets. Needless to say, one reason is QE introduced by major central banks since the global financial crisis. Regarding this point as well, the problem has temporarily eased due to the massive amount of fiscal spending to address the pandemic by each government (although major central banks absorbing most of increased issuance of government bonds via large-scale asset purchase programs, pressure due to increased issuance prevailing).

Pandemic-related fiscal spending is very extensive, but this is just a temporary factor. On the other hand, QE is expected to be implemented over the longer term. In the case of continued low inflation, QE would also be prolonged, and the easing effects of supply/demand conditions due to increased issuance of government bonds would likely be absorbed as time passes. Rather, it is highly likely that central banks will fret about ways to rein in excessive flattening under this structure, while continuing with QE.

Chart: Balance Sheets at Major Central Banks to Continue to Expand amid Low Inflation, ELB Restriction



Source: Bloomberg; compiled by Daiwa Securities.

The aforementioned sections are examinations regarding factors behind yield declines. In closing this report, I explain the point that the Japanese yield curve has markedly steepened in global comparison.


Although some often attribute the steepening to increased JGB issuance, the true reason is probably the change in the BOJ's stance on operations. If the BOJ increases the purchase amount in its operations by the same amount as the increased issuance, it is possible to neutralize the impact on the yield curve (sterilization). However, the BOJ did not dare do so, and it kept the offer amounts in the superlong zone unchanged, which is key this time. The yield curve can steepen only because of the YCC policy, which is the reason for the markedly steepened Japanese yield curve in global comparison.

Due to the change in the BOJ's stance, it has become definitive that the JGB yield curve will temporarily steepen in the stage of increased issuance. Meanwhile, what will happen when the "crocodile's mouth" normalizes and the JGB issuance amount is reduced? In such a case, the BOJ is likely to reduce the purchase amount by the same amount as the decreased issuance in the short-term/intermediate zone, where its purchase amount was upped in line with the increased issuance. On the other hand, the scope to reduce the offer amounts in the superlong zone is limited as the BOJ did not raise the purchase amount

when the issuance was increased. Accordingly, it is highly possible that the decreased issuance amount will directly lower yields in the superlong zone.

In Japan, short-term pressure to increase JGB issuance is strong. That said, the amount is determined by the degree of the “crocodile’s mouth,” —i.e., the difference between revenues and tax income. As we reported before, [the crocodile’s mouth in FY20 is large](#), as its jaw is dislocated (chart on next page), reflecting the fact that the COVID-19 crisis has triggered one of the worst recessions in history. Given that the pandemic is one of the shortest in history, the crocodile’s mouth in the future is unlikely to remain the same size as that in FY20. The Fiscal System Council remained silent, recognizing that we are facing difficulty on a national scale. However, it has started to warn against the loosening of fiscal discipline,¹ endorsing the fact that the crocodile’s mouth will become smaller going forward.

Chart: Expenditures and Revenues in General Account (crocodile’s mouth with dislocated jaw)



Source: MOF; compiled by Daiwa Securities.

Due to the aforementioned considerations, we can forecast the path of Japan’s superlong yields. In the near term, “short-term steepening pressure” is likely to remain. However, when the number of investors who are aware of the market after increased JGB issuance becomes the majority, “long-term flattening pressure” would prevail (continuation of low-level yields) and yields are expected to decline to a level that reflects the neutral interest rate².

Based on this outlook, our near-term recommendations are a steeper trade for short-term investors and a “leveling purchase stance plus something extra” for long-term investors. In particular, now is an important time for long-term investors, and they should build positions as much as possible before market participants start to consider the stage of decreased JGB issuance. During the current period of increased issuance, there is no need to chase high prices in the secondary market. However, meaningful purchases are recommended at superlong JGB auctions in this fiscal year.

¹ On 2 July, Sadayuki Sakakibara, former chairman of the Japan Business Federation, stated that “I have no doubt that we should prioritize measures to protect public health, lives, and life amid this national difficulty.” He also said that “we are positioned to say ‘please do not forget fiscal discipline.’”

² If we assume 10-year yield of around 0%, points of reference for 20-year and 30-year yields are around 0.3% and 0.5%.

Explanatory Document of Unregistered Credit Ratings

In order to ensure the fairness and transparency in the markets, Credit Rating Agencies became subject to the Credit Rating Agencies' registration system based on the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act. In accordance with this Act, in soliciting customers, Financial Instruments Business Operators, etc. shall not use the credit ratings provided by unregistered Credit Rating Agencies without informing customers of the fact that those Credit Rating Agencies are not registered, and shall also inform customers of the significance and limitations of credit ratings, etc.

■ The Significance of Registration

Registered Credit Rating Agencies are subject to the following regulations:

- 1) Duty of good faith.
- 2) Establishment of control systems (fairness of the rating process, and prevention of conflicts of interest, etc.).
- 3) Prohibition of the ratings in cases where Credit Rating Agencies have a close relationship with the issuers of the financial instruments to be rated, etc.
- 4) Duty to disclose information (preparation and publication of rating policies, etc. and public disclosure of explanatory documents).

In addition to the above, Registered Credit Rating Agencies are subject to the supervision of the Financial Services Agency ("FSA"), and as such may be ordered to produce reports, be subject to on-site inspection, and be ordered to improve business operations, whereas unregistered Credit Rating Agencies are free from such regulations and supervision.

■ Credit Rating Agencies

[Standard & Poor's]

The Name of the Credit Rating Agencies group, etc

The name of the Credit Rating Agencies group: S&P Global Ratings ("Standard & Poor's")

The name and registration number of the Registered Credit Rating Agency in the group: S&P Global Ratings Japan Inc. (FSA commissioner (Rating) No.5)

How to acquire information related to an outline of the rating policies and methods adopted by the person who determines Credit Ratings

The information is posted under "Unregistered Rating Information" (<http://www.standardandpoors.co.jp/unregistered>) in the "Library and Regulations" section on the website of S&P Global Ratings Japan Inc. (<http://www.standardandpoors.co.jp>)

Assumptions, Significance and Limitations of Credit Ratings

Credit ratings assigned by Standard & Poor's are statements of opinion on the future credit quality of specific issuers or issues as of the date they are expressed and they are not indexes which show the probability of the occurrence of the failure to pay by the issuer or a specific debt and do not guarantee creditworthiness. Credit ratings are not a recommendation to purchase, sell or hold any securities, or a statement of market liquidity or prices in the secondary market of any issues.

Credit ratings may change depending on various factors, including issuers' performance, changes in external environment, performance of underlying assets, creditworthiness of counterparties and others. Standard & Poor's conducts rating analysis based on information it believes to be provided by the reliable source and assigns credit ratings only when it believes there is enough information in terms of quality and quantity to make a conclusion. However, Standard & Poor's does not perform an audit, due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives from the issuer or a third party, or guarantee its accuracy, completeness or timeliness of the results by using the information. Moreover, it needs to be noted that it may incur a potential risk due to the limitation of the historical data that are available for use depending on the rating.

This information is based on information Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd. has received from sources it believes to be reliable as of March 7th, 2017, but it does not guarantee accuracy or completeness of this information. For details, please refer to the website of S&P Global Ratings Japan Inc. (<http://www.standardandpoors.co.jp>)

[Moody's]

The Name of the Credit Rating Agencies Group, etc

The name of the Credit Rating Agencies group: Moody's Investors Service ("MIS")

The name and registration number of the Registered Credit Rating Agency in the group: Moody's Japan K.K. (FSA commissioner (Rating) No.2)

How to acquire information related to an outline of the rating policies and methods adopted by the person who determines Credit Ratings

The information is posted under "Unregistered Rating explanation" in the section on "The use of Ratings of Unregistered Agencies" on the website of Moody's Japan K.K. (The website can be viewed after clicking on "Credit Rating Business" on the Japanese version of Moody's website (https://www.moody.com/pages/default_ja.aspx))

Assumptions, Significance and Limitations of Credit Ratings

Credit ratings are Moody's Investors Service's ("MIS") current opinions of the relative future credit risk of entities, credit commitments, or debt or debt-like securities. MIS defines credit risk as the risk that an entity may not meet its contractual, financial obligations as they come due and any estimated financial loss in the event of default. Credit ratings do not address any other risk, including but not limited to: liquidity risk, market value risk, or price volatility. Credit ratings do not constitute investment or financial advice, and credit ratings are not recommendations to purchase, sell, or hold particular securities. No warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy, timeliness, completeness, merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose of any such rating or other opinion or information, is given or made by MIS in any form or manner whatsoever.

Based on the information received from issuers or from public sources, the credit risks of the issuers or obligations are assessed. MIS adopts all necessary measures so that the information it uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and from sources MIS considers to be reliable. However, MIS is not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify or validate information received in the rating process.

This information is based on information Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd. has received from sources it believes to be reliable as of April 16th, 2018, but it does not guarantee accuracy or completeness of this information. For details, please refer to the website of Moody's Japan K.K. (https://www.moody.com/pages/default_ja.aspx)

[Fitch]

The Name of the Credit Rating Agencies group, etc

The name of the Credit Rating Agencies group: Fitch Ratings ("Fitch")

The name and registration number of the Registered Credit Rating Agency in the group: Fitch Ratings Japan Limited (FSA commissioner (Rating) No.7)

How to acquire information related to an outline of the rating policies and methods adopted by the person who determines Credit Ratings

The information is posted under "Outline of Rating Policies" in the section of "Regulatory Affairs" on the website of Fitch Ratings Japan Limited (<https://www.fitchratings.com/site/japan>)

Assumptions, Significance and Limitations of Credit Ratings

Ratings assigned by Fitch are opinions based on established criteria and methodologies. Ratings are not facts, and therefore cannot be described as being "accurate" or "inaccurate". Credit ratings do not directly address any risk other than credit risk. Credit ratings do not comment on the adequacy of market price or market liquidity for rated instruments. Ratings are relative measures of risk; as a result, the assignment of ratings in the same category to entities and obligations may not fully reflect small differences in the degrees of risk. Credit ratings, as opinions on relative ranking of vulnerability to default, do not imply or convey a specific statistical probability of default.

In issuing and maintaining its ratings, Fitch relies on factual information it receives from issuers and underwriters and from other sources Fitch believes to be credible. Fitch conducts a reasonable investigation of the factual information relied upon by it in accordance with its ratings methodology, and obtains reasonable verification of that information from independent sources, to the extent such sources are available for a given security or in a given jurisdiction. The assignment of a rating to any issuer or any security should not be viewed as a guarantee of the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of the information relied on in connection with the rating or the results obtained from the use of such information. If any such information should turn out to contain misrepresentations or to be otherwise misleading, the rating associated with that information may not be appropriate. Despite any verification of current facts, ratings can be affected by future events or conditions that were not anticipated at the time a rating was issued or affirmed.

For the details of assumption, purpose and restriction of credit ratings, please refer to "Definitions of ratings and other forms of opinion" on the website of Fitch Rating Japan Limited.

This information is based on information Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd. has received from sources it believes to be reliable as of September 27th, 2019, but it does not guarantee accuracy or completeness of this information. For details, please refer to the website of Fitch Rating Japan Limited (<https://www.fitchratings.com/site/japan>)

IMPORTANT

This report is provided as a reference for making investment decisions and is not intended to be a solicitation for investment. Investment decisions should be made at your own discretion and risk. Content herein is based on information available at the time the report was prepared and may be amended or otherwise changed in the future without notice. We make no representations as to the accuracy or completeness. Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd. retains all rights related to the content of this report, which may not be redistributed or otherwise transmitted without prior consent.

Conflicts of Interest: Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd. may currently provide or may intend to provide investment banking services or other services to the company referred to in this report. In such cases, said services could give rise to conflicts of interest for Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd.

Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd. and Daiwa Securities Group Inc.: Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd. is a subsidiary of Daiwa Securities Group Inc.

Other Disclosures Concerning Individual Issues:

1) As of 26 April 2016, Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd., its parent company Daiwa Securities Group Inc., GMO Financial Holdings, Inc., and its subsidiary GMO CLICK Securities, Inc. concluded a basic agreement for the establishment of a business alliance between the four companies.

As of end-December 2017, Daiwa Securities Group Inc. owned shares in GMO Financial Holdings, Inc. equivalent to approximately 9.3% of the latter's outstanding shares. Given future developments in and benefits from the prospective business alliance, Daiwa Securities Group Inc. could boost its stake in GMO Financial Holdings, Inc. to up to 20% of outstanding shares.

2) Daiwa Real Estate Asset Management is a subsidiary of Daiwa Securities Group Inc. and serves as the asset management company for the following J-REITS: Daiwa Office Investment Corporation (8976), Daiwa Securities Living Investment Corporation (8986).

3) Samty Residential Investment became a consolidated subsidiary of Daiwa Securities Group Inc. effective 10 September 2019.

4) On 30 May 2019, Daiwa Securities Group Inc. formalized an equity/business alliance with Samty, and as of 14 June 2019 it owned 16.95% of shares outstanding in Samty along with convertible bonds with a par value of ¥10bn. Conversion of all of said convertible bonds into common shares would bring the stake of Daiwa Securities Group Inc. in Samty to 27.28%.

5) Daiwa Securities Group Inc. and Credit Saison Co., Ltd. entered into a capital and business alliance, effective 5 September 2019. In line with this alliance, Daiwa Securities Group Inc. is to acquire up to 5.01% of Credit Saison's total common shares outstanding (excl. treasury shares; as of 31 Jul 2019).

6) NEC (6701): NOTICE REGARDING U.S. PERSONS: This report is not intended for distribution to or use by any person in the United States. Securities issued by NEC Corporation have been suspended from registration in the U.S. and are subject to an order of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission dated June 17, 2008, pursuant to Section 12(j) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This document is not a recommendation or inducement of any purchase or sale of such securities by any person or entity located in the U.S. Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd. disclaims any responsibility to any such person with respect to the content of this document. Any U.S. person receiving a copy of this report should disregard it.

Notification items pursuant to Article 37 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law

(This Notification is only applicable to where report is distributed by Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd.)

If you decide to enter into a business arrangement with our company based on the information described in this report, we ask you to pay close attention to the following items.

- In addition to the purchase price of a financial instrument, our company will collect a trading commission* for each transaction as agreed beforehand with you. Since commissions may be included in the purchase price or may not be charged for certain transactions, we recommend that you confirm the commission for each transaction. In some cases, our company also may charge a maximum of ¥2 million per year as a standing proxy fee for our deposit of your securities, if you are a non-resident.
- For derivative and margin transactions etc., our company may require collateral or margin requirements in accordance with an agreement made beforehand with you. Ordinarily in such cases, the amount of the transaction will be in excess of the required collateral or margin requirements**.
- There is a risk that you will incur losses on your transactions due to changes in the market price of financial instruments based on fluctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, stock prices, real estate prices, commodity prices, and others. In addition, depending on the content of the transaction, the loss could exceed the amount of the collateral or margin requirements.
- There may be a difference between bid price etc. and ask price etc. of OTC derivatives handled by our company.
- Before engaging in any trading, please thoroughly confirm accounting and tax treatments regarding your trading in financial instruments with such experts as certified public accountants.

* The amount of the trading commission cannot be stated here in advance because it will be determined between our company and you based on current market conditions and the content of each transaction etc.

** The ratio of margin requirements etc. to the amount of the transaction cannot be stated here in advance because it will be determined between our company and you based on current market conditions and the content of each transaction etc.

When making an actual transaction, please be sure to carefully read the materials presented to you prior to the execution of agreement, and to take responsibility for your own decisions regarding the signing of the agreement with our company.

Corporate Name: Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd.

Registered: Financial Instruments Business Operator, Chief of Kanto Local Finance Bureau (Kin-sho) No.108

Memberships: Japan Securities Dealers Association, The Financial Futures Association of Japan, Japan Investment Advisers Association, Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association