

Daiwa's View

What are the potential obstacles to BOJ raising rates in 2025?

- BOJ views autumn as the earliest timing for rate hike
- A rate hike would require that mechanism in which wages and prices influence each other positively continued uninterrupted
- Potential obstacles to BOJ raising rates within the year: (1) greater-than-expected deterioration in corporate business conditions from this autumn onwards, (2) extreme political instability, and (3) aggressive rate cuts by Fed due to concerns about softening of US labor market

FICC Research Dept.

Kenji Yamamoto 81-3-5555-8784 kenji.yamamoto@daiwa.co.jp



Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd.

Fog is unlikely to clear up all at once

As widely expected, the BOJ maintained its policy interest rate at 0.5% at the July Monetary Policy Meeting (MPM), while making an upward revision to its inflation outlook and risk balance to prices. The Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices report (Outlook Report) noted, "There have been positive developments in trade and other policies, such as negotiations between Japan and the United States resulting in an agreement." It described the uncertainty regarding future economic activity and prices as high, albeit softening the wording from the "extremely high" used in the previous report. The report also touched on upside risks, such as "the possibility that developments such as recent moves toward fiscal expansion, particularly in the United States and Europe, could push up the global economy."

In his post-meeting press conference, BOJ Governor Kazuo Ueda described the US/Japan tariff agreement as a big step forward that would lead to reduced uncertainty surrounding the Japanese economy. However, he also said that it was still unclear where and how the impacts would appear, and that the fog was unlikely to clear up all at once, indicating a cautious stance of carefully watching future economic indicators.

Governor Ueda also downplayed the risk of falling behind the curve on inflation, stating that the upward revision to the FY25 price projection was mostly attributed to food, and that the BOJ did not believe that monetary policy was influenced by that. As such, he opposed the idea that a rate hike was appropriate to cope with short-term external cost-push inflation, which appears to have been perceived as dovish by the market¹.

Likelihood of achieving the outlook has increased slightly

The July *Outlook Report* maintained the previous view that the "underlying CPI inflation is likely to be sluggish, mainly due to the deceleration in the economy." As for the conduct of monetary policy, the report stated that "the Bank, in accordance with improvement in economic activity and prices, will continue to raise the policy interest rate." Given these statements, some appear to feel that a rate hike would be challenging.

However, Governor Ueda explicitly stated in his press conference that underlying inflation was rising slightly, as it had not yet stalled due to the impact of tariffs. He also said that the BOJ would make a decision on future monetary policy based on whether the likelihood of the projected path improved, and would not wait for underlying inflation to take hold. When asked about changes from the previous *Outlook Report*, he said that there was no significant change in the baseline projections, but added that confidence in achieving the projections had increased slightly.

¹ In the first place, it would be unlikely for a central bank governor to answer a question like this by saying that the risk of falling behind the curve was high.



The BOJ's stance of raising rates in accordance with an increased likelihood of achieving the outlook or greater confidence in projections (as Governor Ueda put it) remains unchanged. Therefore, if the likelihood of achieving the outlook has increased even slightly, it would be reasonable to interpret this as a step closer to a rate hike.

A rate hike would require that mechanism in which wages and prices influence each other positively continued uninterrupted

Governor Ueda deliberately avoided specifying the timing or conditions for the next rate hike. He indicated his intention to review data in the lead up to the next hike, and, notably, stated that the BOJ wanted to confirm whether the mechanism in which wages and prices influence each other positively continued uninterrupted.

The BOJ seems to forecast that (1) economic activity will soften in 2H 2025 (as expected) due to the combination of solid corporate sentiment (as seen in recent Tankan surveys) and the structurally tight labor market, and that (2), consequently, wage increases will continue, although not at the remarkable level seen in the 2025 spring wage negotiations.

In other words, rather than meaning that the data would need to show surprises on the upside, the wording "uninterrupted" implies that the BOJ would be OK if the uncertainty ("fog") with regard to the outlook diminished (cleared up) due to the impact from tariffs on economic activity and corporate sentiment not being worse than the BOJ's baseline "soft patch" scenario.

Raising wages properly in spring wage negotiations is becoming the norm

Although the press conference was regarded as dovish, Governor Ueda mentioned that the trend with solid wage hikes in spring wage negotiations had continued for several years and was becoming the norm, and that this warranted attention, and that, with the underlying inflation rate approaching 2% and inflation expectations rising to some extent, it was necessary to pay closer attention to the possibility that the headline CPI might impact core inflation and inflation expectations. These comments at least did not seem to have a dovish nuance.

♦ July BOJ Outlook Report (31 Jul 2025)

As recent price rises are also somewhat attributable to the pass-through of increased personnel expenses and distribution costs to selling prices, it is possible that the price rises will persist for longer than expected, depending on firms' wage- and price-setting behavior. Since consumers purchase food items on a frequent basis, if the price rises persist, attention is warranted on the possibility that this may induce second-round effects on underlying CPI inflation through changes in household sentiment and inflation expectations.

In other words, given the current price situation, we are entering a phase in which it is increasingly important to consider the risk that the BOJ's main scenario (that the underlying inflation rate will stall temporarily) may not materialize. Governor Ueda's statement that the BOJ wanted to make policy decisions while taking such possibilities into account points to the risk-management approach mentioned by Deputy Governor Shinichi Uchida. This approach does not simply justify waiting blindly; rather, it calls for adjusting "monetary policy to best balance the upside and downside risks from the perspective of maintaining stability in economic activity and prices²."

- 2 -

² At his post–July FOMC press conference, Fed Chair Powell also stated that policy would be determined based on "the evolving balance of risks."



Core Core CPI and Inflation Surprise Index in Japan



Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Bloomberg; compiled by Daiwa.

The current BOJ monetary policy stance is accommodative (with real interest rates at very low levels). Furthermore, given that the risk balance to prices has shifted towards a neutral direction compared to the previous outlook, we think that it is natural that the BOJ's "neutral position" would change from the standpoint of risk management.

The next rate hike is expected at the October meeting at the soonest

According to an urgent economist survey by Bloomberg after the July MPM, 42% of respondents anticipated that the next rate hike would be in October (which was the highest percentage), while 76% believed that the tariff agreement raised the possibility of a rate hike within the year. Before the July meeting, 36% (the highest percentage) had expected a hike in January 2026, which we found surprising. Now, many economists appear to be properly interpreting the July *Outlook Report* and the BOJ's policy reaction functions. The percentage of economists expecting a rate hike within the year rose from 42% to 53%.

After the July MPM, *Nikkei* also reported that the earliest timing for a rate hike was seen as autumn at the BOJ, and it noted that data and information on corporate earnings, capex, and price/wage settings would be gathered through the Tankan survey and the branch managers' meeting in October, and that BOJ officials said that they wanted to see the Tankan and reports at the branch managers' meeting. We find nothing at all unusual about projections of a rate hike as early as October.

Potential obstacles to BOJ raising rates in 2025 (1): Corporate business conditions turning out weaker than expected from this autumn onwards

If the fog clears and new data arrives, the BOJ is likely to gain enough confidence in wage prospects to raise rates this year (as early as October). If anything, the question going forward will be what could prevent a rate hike from being implemented within the year.

Of course, if the impact from tariffs were greater than expected and raised the risk to wages, and if the BOJ determined that that raised concerns about winter bonuses or 2026 spring wage negotiations failing, the Bank might refrain from raising rates and wait until the outcome of spring wage negotiations was almost certain (i.e., between January and March 2026).

On 1 August, the *Mainichi Shimbun* reported that a BOJ official cautioned that it would not be surprising if weaker-than-expected data (on corporate business conditions and other data) appeared from this autumn onwards. While the author personally feels that such concerns are



unfounded, we will have to check the situation with the next Tankan survey and the branch managers' meeting.

Potential obstacles to BOJ raising rates in 2025 (2): Extreme political instability

Generally, it is easy to see how domestic political uncertainty could constitute an obstacle to the BOJ raising rates. That said, unless we see a stock market crash due to extreme political turmoil—such as a split in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party—political uncertainty is unlikely to act as a major constraint on the BOJ raising rates.

In fact, the ongoing discussions within the ruling and opposition parties and anticipated political frameworks suggest that an increasingly expansionary fiscal stance will be taken. Of course, this expansionary fiscal stance can be seen as a factor in (1) strengthening the BOJ's feeling that its economic and price outlook is "on track" and (2) increasing the incentive for rate hikes. Considering that the surge in prices has become a political issue, as well, the political (administration) side is unlikely to provide strong opposition to rate hikes (preventing the risk of yen depreciation).

Potential obstacles to BOJ raising rates in 2025 (3): Aggressive rate cuts by Fed

The most troublesome factor among the potential obstacles could be the Fed's stance on rate cuts. However, to state our conclusion from the outset, if the Fed were to implement gradual rate cuts starting September in line with our expectations, this would increase the prospects for a "soft landing" with the US economy, and with the market environment being risk-on, this would not act as a major constraint to the BOJ raising rates.

However, if the Fed were forced to implement aggressive rate cuts due to a weakening US economy (labor market), like what happened from last summer onwards, the BOJ would likely maintain a "wait-and-see" stance until that "storm" passed. Currently, the US labor market is just undergoing a "cooling down" as overly optimistic market views have been corrected, and the recession risk is not necessarily rising rapidly.

(%) (pt) S&P 500 Index 2 Apr: Reciprocal tariffs 6600 10 Probability of US recession 15 6400 (right, inverse scale) 20 6200 25 6000 30 5800 35 5600 40 45 5400 50 5200 55 5000 60 4800 65 4600 70 Jul-24 Oct-24 Jan-25 Apr-25 Jul-25 Apr-24

S&P 500 Index, Recession Probability (10yr - 3mo)

Source: New York Fed, S&P; compiled by Daiwa.

However, as Fed Governor Christopher Waller said, "When labor markets turn, they often turn fast," so the BOJ's policy environment could change dramatically, depending on labor market developments. While these three potential obstacles to the BOJ raising rates this year are expected to be resolved over time, the BOJ will likely be spending the summer monitoring how these issues pan out.



IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES

This report is provided as a reference for making investment decisions and is not intended to be a solicitation for investment. Investment decisions should be made at your own discretion and risk. Content herein is based on information available at the time the report was prepared and may be amended or otherwise changed in the future without notice. We make no representations as to the accuracy or completeness. Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd. retains all rights related to the content of this report, which may not be redistributed or otherwise transmitted without prior consent.

Rating

Issues are rated 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 as follows:

- 1: Outperform TOPIX/benchmark index by more than 15% over the next 12 months.
- 2: Outperform TOPIX/benchmark index by 5-15% over the next 12 months.
- 3: Out/underperform TOPIX/benchmark index by less than 5% over the next 12 months.
- 4: Underperform TOPIX/benchmark index by 5-15% over the next 12 months.
- 5: Underperform TOPIX/benchmark index by more than 15% over the next 12 months.

Benchmark index: TOPIX for Japan, S&P 500 for US, STOXX Europe 600 for Europe, HSI for Hong Kong, STI for Singapore, KOSPI for Korea, TWII for Taiwan, and S&P/ASX 200 for Australia.

Target Prices

Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd. sets target prices based on its analysts' earnings estimates for subject companies. Risks to target prices include, but are not limited to, unexpected significant changes in subject companies' earnings trends and the macroeconomic environment.

Disclosures related to Daiwa Securities

Please refer to https://drp.daiwa.co.jp/rp-daiwa/direct/reportDisclaimer/e_disclaimer.pdf for information on conflicts of interest for Daiwa Securities, held by Daiwa Securities, companies for which Daiwa Securities or foreign affiliates of Daiwa Securities Group have acted as a lead underwriter, and other disclosures concerning individual companies. If you need more information on this matter, please contact the Research Production Department of Daiwa Securities

Explanatory Document of Unregistered Credit Ratings

This report may use credit ratings assigned by rating agencies that are not registered with Japan's Financial Services Agency pursuant to Article 66, Paragraph 27 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act. Please review the relevant disclaimer regarding credit ratings issued by such agencies at: https://drp.daiwa.co.jp/rp-daiwa/direct/reportDisclaimer/credit_ratings.pdf. If you need more information on this matter, please contact the Research Production Department of Daiwa Securities.

Notification items pursuant to Article 37 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law

(This Notification is only applicable to where report is distributed by Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd.)

If you decide to enter into a business arrangement with our company based on the information described in this report, we ask you to pay close attention to the following items.

- In addition to the purchase price of a financial instrument, our company will collect a trading commission* for each transaction as agreed beforehand with you. Since commissions may be included in the purchase price or may not be charged for certain transactions, we recommend that you confirm the commission for each transaction. In some cases, our company also may charge a maximum of ¥2 million per year as a standing proxy fee for our deposit of your securities, if you are a non-resident.
- For derivative and margin transactions etc., our company may require collateral or margin requirements in accordance with an agreement made beforehand with you. Ordinarily in such cases, the amount of the transaction will be in excess of the required collateral or margin requirements**.
- There is a risk that you will incur losses on your transactions due to changes in the market price of financial instruments based on fluctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, stock prices, real estate prices, commodity prices, and others. In addition, depending on the content of the transaction, the loss could exceed the amount of the collateral or margin requirements.
- There may be a difference between bid price etc. and ask price etc. of OTC derivatives handled by our company.
- Before engaging in any trading, please thoroughly confirm accounting and tax treatments regarding your trading in financial instruments with such experts as certified public accountants.
- * The amount of the trading commission cannot be stated here in advance because it will be determined between our company and you based on current market conditions and the content of each transaction etc.
- ** The ratio of margin requirements etc. to the amount of the transaction cannot be stated here in advance because it will be determined between our company and you based on current market conditions and the content of each transaction etc.

When making an actual transaction, please be sure to carefully read the materials presented to you prior to the execution of agreement, and to take responsibility for your own decisions regarding the signing of the agreement with our company.

Corporate Name: Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd.

Registered: Financial Instruments Business Operator, Chief of Kanto Local Finance Bureau (Kin-sho) No.108

Memberships: Japan Securities Dealers Association, The Financial Futures Association of Japan, Japan Investment Advisers Association, Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association, Japan Security Token Offering Association